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Until at least 4 years of age, children, unlike adults, interpret some as compatible with all.
The inability to draw the pragmatic inference leading to interpret some as not all, could be
taken to indicate a delay in pragmatic abilities, despite evidence of other early pragmatic
skills. However, little is known about how the production of these implicature develops.
We conducted a corpus study on early production and perception of the scalar term
some in British English. Children’s utterances containing some were extracted from the
dense corpora of five children aged 2;00 to 5;01 (N = 5,276), and analysed alongside
a portion of their caregivers’ utterances with some (N = 9,030). These were coded
into structural and contextual categories allowing for judgments on the probability of
a scalar implicature being intended. The findings indicate that children begin producing
and interpreting implicatures in a pragmatic way during their third year of life, shortly after
they first produce some. Their production of some implicatures is low but matches their
parents’ input in frequency. Interestingly, the mothers’ production of implicatures also
increases as a function of the children’s age. The data suggest that as soon as they
acquire some, children are fully competent in its production and mirror adult production.
The contrast between the very early implicature production we find and the relatively
late implicature comprehension established in the literature calls for an explanation;
possibly in terms of the processing cost of implicature derivation. Additionally, some
is multifaceted, and thus, implicatures are infrequent, and structurally and contextually
constrained in both populations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A lot of information conveyed in conversation is not communicated explicitly, but implicitly; it is
left for the audience to infer. For instance, if a student says she “read some of the papers assigned,”
the listener may infer that she has not read all of them even though this was not been stated.
Deriving the implicit interpretation of an utterance seems challenging for young children (Noveck,
2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003). Most work on how children come to grips with implicit
meaning was carried out on scalar terms such as some. These expressions are part of a semantic
informativeness scale (e.g., some, most, all) and the use of a weaker term on the scale (some or
most) will often be taken to imply the negation of the stronger term (all) giving rise to a scalar
implicature.
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In experimental contexts, children, unlike adults, interpret
some as compatible with all, and are not found to be adult-
like until seven (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003;
Guasti et al., 2005; Huang and Snedeker, 2009b). While the age at
which children draw scalar implicatures has been pushed down
in some paradigms, they are still not found to interpret some in
a pragmatic way until at least 4 years of age (Pouscoulous et al.,
2007; Katsos and Bishop, 2011).
One of the keys to the enigma of scalar implicature
development has to be production. Indeed, little is known about
how the most popular scalar term, some, is produced by children.
In the hope to shed light on implicature competence in early
childhoodwe conducted a corpus study looking at the production
of the quantifier some by five British English children aged two to
five and their caregivers.
Most experimental work on children’s understanding of
implicit meaning has focused on children’s interpretation of
scalar implicatures. These occur when a speaker chooses to use a
weaker expression (e.g., some) where she could just as easily have
used a stronger one (i.e., all) and the hearer thereby understands
that she has reasons not to use the stronger one—either because
she did not have sufficient information or because she knew that
it was inappropriate to use the stronger expression.
According to Grice’s (1957; 1989) widely accepted model,
implicatures—including scalar implicatures—are propositions
that the speaker intends to communicate even though she does
not express them explicitly. Hearers can infer the intended
implicature by assuming that the speaker is cooperative and
that she tries, as much as possible, to follow the conversational
maxims of quantity, relevance, truth, and manner. In the case
of scalar expressions such as some the hearer assumes that the
speaker abides by the first sub-maxim of quantity (“Make your
contribution as informative as is required”), at least so long as
she can honour the second sub-maxim of quality, as well (“Do
not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”). Therefore,
in the example above, the hearer can infer that the speaker
intends to convey the upper-bounded reading of some (not all)
either because she does not know if the student read all the
papers, or because she knows that the student did not read all of
them. Depending on the context, scalar terms may therefore have
two different interpretations, either a lower-bounded reading
where some is compatible with all or an upper-bounded one,
which excludes all. It is important to bear in mind that in real
conversational uses a context might neither clearly prompt nor
exclude a some-related implicature; in such contexts the relevance
of the stronger alternative (all) may be uncertain and hearers’
intuitions might diverge on whether a scalar implicature was
intended by the speaker.
Scalar implicatures are particularly interesting for two
reasons. First, they have stirred up a lot of theoretical controversy
in recent years (for a review, see Geurts, 2010). It is hotly
debated whether these implicatures are an output of grammar
(Chierchia et al., 2012) or of fully-fledge pragmatic inferences.
Amongst the defenders of the latter position, some view them
as regular implicatures (“particularised” implicatures, in Gricean
terms), which are derived only when prompted by the context
(Noveck and Sperber, 2007; Geurts, 2010), while others argue
they are “generalised” implicatures—i.e., they arise unless the
context blocks them (Horn, 1989) or even by default (Levinson,
2000). Second, scalar implicatures often arise from the use of
specific terms such as some, whichmakes themmuch easier to use
in experimental settings. And, indeed, fueled by the theoretical
debates, scalars have given rise to an important body of adult
empirical work (for a review, see Breheny, forthcoming). The
assumption behindmuch work on pragmatic development is that
the findings on scalar implicatures can be generalised to other
types of implicit meaning. Most studies on scalar expressions
focus on the quantifiers some. In practice, this means our
knowledge on children and implicatures is largely based on their
understanding of some (for other implicatures, see Noveck et al.,
2009; Schulze et al., 2013; Wilson, 2017).
Noveck (2001) conducted the first systematic experiments
on children treatment of scalar expressions. He asked 8- to
10-year-olds to assess sentences of the form “Some giraffes
have long necks,” which are logically true, but pragmatically
underinformative, since “all giraffes have long necks.” Most
children accepted the pragmatically underinformative utterances
as true (at rates of 89%), while adults tended to reject them as
false (41% accepted these as true). Unlike adults, children accept
(rather than reject) utterances expressed with relatively weak
terms when a stronger one is called for, and thus appear to be
more literal than adults. These results were supported at the time
by classic studies that inadvertently included scalar expressions
(Paris, 1973; Smith, 1980; Braine and Rumain, 1981). Since then,
several studies further demonstrated the phenomenon using
a range of experimental methods (Papafragou and Musolino,
2003; Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Huang and
Snedeker, 2009b). The effect seems to hold cross-linguistically
with quantifiers (Katsos et al., 2016) and can be generalised
to other scalar expressions; it has been found with 5-year-olds
with or (not and) (Chierchia, 2004), might (not must) (Noveck,
2001), start (not finish) as well as numerals (Papafragou and
Musolino, 2003). In all these experiments, the great majority
of children accepted the weaker term as compatible with a
stronger one, whereas adults would either consider them to be
incompatible or at the very least be equivocal. Taken together,
these findings might suggest that young children are unable
to derive pragmatic inferences prompted by scalar expressions
(for reviews on developmental findings on scalars, see Siegal
and Surian, 2004; Pouscoulous and Noveck, 2009; Katsos, 2014;
Papafragou and Skordos, 2016).
Children’s performance on these implicature comprehension
tasks is not due to semantic shortcomings. Indeed, children
acquire some and all at around age 2 in both comprehension
(roughly 16 months) and production (at roughly 26 months,
Fenson et al., 1994). Furthermore, control conditions on most
of the experiments described above indicate that children have
a good semantic grasp of the two quantifiers (although, for a
more nuanced picture, see Barner et al., 2009; Horowitz et al.,
2017). Yet, other factors may influence children’s performance
on linguistic tasks—and in particular their understanding of
pragmatic phenomena. Most studies mentioned above involve
some type of sentence verification task. Children have to judge
the truth or, at least, the adequacy of an utterance, a task which
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taps into their metalinguistic abilities. These develop through
childhood, and children have been shown to understand a
pragmatic phenomenon at an earlier age when assessed on non-
metalinguistic tasks (such as act-out tasks or picture selection
tasks) than when their comprehension of the same phenomenon
is established based on tasks involving metalinguistic skills (see,
e.g., Bernicot et al., 2007). In some paradigms, children have
been shown to derive scalar implicatures, suggesting their poor
performance is not due to semantic or pragmatic inability.
Indeed, 5-year-olds’ performance improves when they are trained
to detect pragmatic infelicities (Papafragou and Musolino,
2003; Guasti et al., 2005). Importantly, it also does when the
implicature outcome is mademore salient and relevant in context
(Papafragou and Musolino, 2003; Guasti et al., 2005; Foppolo
et al., 2012; Skordos and Papafragou, 2016). Even 4-year-olds
have been shown to derive scalar implicatures in two paradigms.
In one of them, the child’s understanding was assessed using a
ternary scale rather than a binary choice; children could reward
the speaker’s utterance with a small, medium, or large strawberry
rather than decide they were right or wrong (Katsos and Bishop,
2011). In the other, a simplified act-out paradigm was designed
aiming to reduce task cognitive load and the effort involved in
deriving the scalar implicature (Pouscoulous et al., 2007). Thus,
children have been found to compute scalar implicatures linked
to some from 4 years onwards but not younger (Pouscoulous
et al. 2007; Katsos and Bishop 2011; see Stiller et al., 2014, for
comprehension of non-lexicalised scalar implicatures in 3-year-
olds).
There is therefore still a gap between the moment children
produce and understand some and the point where they
have been shown to derive its upper-bounded reading in an
experimental context. Four main accounts of this phenomenon
have been put forward. According to Katsos and Bishop (2011),
young children understand the scalar implicature linked to
some, but they are pragmatically more tolerant than adults. This
leads them to accept utterances with some in contexts where
all would be more appropriate even though they perceive the
term as under-informative. Skordos and Papafragou (2016) on
the other hand, emphasise the importance of conversational
relevance in accessing the stronger alternative (all), and thus
deriving the scalar implicature. Specifically, they maintain that
children’s ability to consider the stronger alternative depends
fundamentally on how relevant this alternative is in context.
When the lexical alternative is explicitly present or when it is
simply contextually relevant, children consider it and infer the
scalar implicature. A third strand has argued that the processing
cost of implicatures is too high for young children; while they
have the ability to understand scalar implicatures, they often lack
the resources to make a relatively effortful inference (Reinhart,
2004; Pouscoulous et al., 2007). Indeed, evidence suggests that
even for adults, scalar implicatures can be cognitively taxing
(Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and Noveck, 2004; Breheny
et al., 2006; De Neys and Schaeken, 2007). Finally, lexicalist
accounts claim that while young children know the meaning
of quantifiers such as some and all, they have not yet acquired
the overarching informativeness scale. This prevents them from
comparing some to all, and thus, from deriving the scalar
implicature (Barner et al., 2010, 2011; Hochstein et al., 2014). It
is worth noting that these accounts are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. The first three, in particular, are sometimes presented
by their supporters as potentially complementary (Katsos, 2014;
Papafragou and Skordos, 2016). The debate to establish the best
account of children’s early difficulties with scalar implicatures is
still very much raging. Yet despite our knowledge of implicature
acquisition being largely based on children’s understanding of
some, we know very little about its production by children—and
only slightly more for adults.
A single study has looked at scalar implicature production in
children. Katsos and Smith (2010) investigated how 7-year-olds
fare with scalar implicatures from a speaker’s as well as a hearer’s
perspective. In addition to a usual binary truth value judgment
task, children were asked to provide descriptions themselves.
While the 7-year-olds’ performance on the sentence verification
task resembles what was found in other studies, they produced
informative sentences at very high rate. These findings could
be taken to point toward a speaker/comprehender asymmetry—
where children find production easier than comprehension—as
is sometimes alluded to for other pragmatic phenomena (e.g.,
informativeness, Davies and Katsos 2010, and presuppositions,
Berger and Höhle, 2012). Importantly, the authors do not
attribute this apparent comprehension-production asymmetry to
a lack of pragmatic competence, but to a different metalinguistic
attitude in children when they have to judge utterances.
The ideal way to investigate the production of some is to study
corpora of real use in addition to experimental methods. Three
corpus studies have looked at adult production of some. The first
is a small scale study in Huang and Snedeker (2009b), where
they extracted 50 random instances of some from the British
National Corpus and analysed them depending on whether
they referred to a subset or not. More convincingly, Degen
(2015) extracted 1748 occurrences of some-NPs from a telephone
dialogue corpus. She excluded 359 some-NPs headed by singular
count nouns and 26 cases where the NP consisted only of some.
The remaining 1363 some instances were used in a web-based
study. Participants recruited on Amazons Mechanical Turk were
asked to judge the probability of an implicature being intended
by assessing the similarity on a 7-point-Likert scale between
the original some utterance and an “implicature paraphrase”
resulting from inserting but not all after some—e.g., “I like to
read some of the philosophy stuff” and “I like to read some, but
not all, of the philosophy stuff.” Sun (2017) uses a very similar
procedure to get implicature plausibility rates for several triggers
extracted from twitter, including 200 instances of some. These
studies were designed to test what Degen calls the “Frequency
Assumption”; an implicit assumption found in much of the
theoretical and empirical literature on scalars that lexicalised
scalar terms, such as some, will more often than not give rise to
implicatures. The findings show that the upper-bound reading
of some is found in naturally occurring speech, but is not
prevalent; a conclusion with important (negative) consequences
for theories relying on a dominant upper-bound interpretation
of scalar terms, such as the defaultism of Levinson (2000) or
syntax-based approaches (Chierchia, 2006; Chierchia et al., 2012).
These results also have implications for children’s acquisition.
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Indeed, a low implicature rate in adult speech might account, in
part, for their difficulties with the lower-bound interpretation of
some.
At this juncture of our understanding of scalar implicature
and its development, a study of naturalistic child and parent
production seems essential. Such data are very difficult to
get in experimental settings, particularly for children, and a
child corpus analysis seems a more convincing way forward.
Yet, while focusing on a corpus reflecting children’s natural
spontaneous speech, as well as their environment, comes with
a host of advantages, it brings its own issues, too. How are
we to assess the speaker’s intention to produce an implicature?
Degen (2015) solves this impasse by postulating that in
communication, hearer’s recognition of speaker’s intention is,
overall, a fair approximation of the speaker’s intention: the
audience’s intuitions about implicatures correspond by and large
to the speaker’s intention to produce them. Unfortunately,
when looking at younger children’s production we cannot rely
on implicature plausibility ratings from untrained Mechanical
Turk participants. But, we can code for the plausibility of an
implicature being intended by the use of some, based on the
context of utterance and tests such as whether it refers to a subset
(Huang and Snedeker, 2009b) or the not all paraphrase (Degen,
2015).
In the following, we therefore present a corpus study
on young children’s production of some, adding a missing
piece to the current literature and our understanding of
early pragmatic abilities. Children’s utterances containing some
were extracted from dense corpora of five children aged 2;00
to 5;01 (N = 5,276), and analysed alongside an equivalent
portion of their mothers’ utterances with some. These were
coded into structural and contextual categories allowing
for judgments on the probability of a scalar implicature
being intended (coding scheme partly based on Degen,
2015).
2. DATA AND METHODS
2.1. The Corpus
We looked at the production of some in dense corpora of
five British English speaking children aged 2;00 to 5;01. Three
sets (Thomas, Fraser and Eleanor) are part of the CHILDES
database (MacWhinney, 2000; Lieven et al., 2009), while two
(Gina and Helen) were accessed with the kind permission of
the Child Study Centre, University of Manchester (De Ruiter
et al., 2017). All families were from the Greater Manchester area
in the United Kingdom. For each child, the corpus included
dense recordings of 5 hours per week for the first 6 weeks
following each of their birthdays, as well as 5 hours within one
week during each of the subsequent months of the year. The
interactions between children and their parents (mostly their
mothers, a father appears once) took place at home usually during
play, reading, or snack time. The children were recorded from
2;00 to 3;01 years for Eleanor and Fraser, from 2;00 to 4;11
years for Thomas, and from 3;00 to 4;07 years for Gina and
Helen.
2.2. Coding
Children’s utterances containing some were extracted with
three lines of context before and after each some occurrence
(N = 5,276). For each child, data were organised into age
windows of 3 months allowing for an analysis of individual
developmental trajectories. To examine inputs in the early
years, we extracted the mothers’ first sentences with some in
a number equivalent to their child’s production (N = 5,430).
To further investigate input development, we extracted another
300 some utterances produced by each of the mothers after
their child’s birthdays (N = 3,556; Total number of utterances
coded for mothers = 9,030). For one mother, the recording
stopped after 256 utterances after the child’s last birthday,
meaning that 300 utterances could not be reached. All 14,306
utterances were categorised following structural and contextual
categories allowing for judgments on the probability of a scalar
implicature.
All utterances were first coded following a structural grid,
according to the type of syntactic structure the word some
appeared in. Eleven structural categories were established: Seven
were marked as Included and four as Excluded. Utterances falling
under the Included categories were subsequently coded according
to the contextual coding scheme while utterances falling within
the Excluded categories could not be coded further due to
missing or incomplete information (e.g., errors, ambiguities).
In a second phase, the Included cases were coded according to
their likelihood of carrying an implicature from some to not
all. Four contextual categories were devised to reflect judgment
on the probability of an implicature being intended: Implicature
Impossible, Implicature Implausible, Implicature Possible, and
Implicature Plausible. The coding scheme was adapted in part
from Degen (2015), and was used equally for children and adult
uses of some. The data and coding of the corpus reported in this
paper are accessible to readers on the Open Science Framework
database at osf.io/g6psr.
2.2.1. Structural Categories
All the extracted some utterances were coded as belonging to
one of the mutually exclusive, structural categories outlined in
Table 1. There are seven Included categories.
1. In the Mass category, some precedes a mass noun including
object mass nouns (e.g., coffee and furniture).
2. The Count as mass category includes count nouns that appear
in a mass noun-like structure (e.g.,Want some banana).
3. The Adjective category includes some utterances headed by an
adjectival noun (often colours, e.g., Need some blue).
4. Similarly, in the Plural noun category the phrase is headed by
a plural noun (e.g., some people).
5. The category Singular NP covers utterances with a singular
count noun. Although the structure is similar to the Count as
mass category they differ in the quantity of the referent; in the
Singular NP cases it only refers to one single entity and not to
a mass (cf. “Some guy predicted the end of the world today,”
Degen, 2015, p. 5, Ex. 12).
6. The Plural NP category includes cases where some is followed
by a count noun in its plural form (e.g., I need some blocks).
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Mass mass NP Mummy want some tea. (E., 2;00)
object mass NP Get some fruit from there. (E., 2;11)
Count as mass sg count NP for quantity I like some banana. (E., 2;00)
Adjective adjectival NP I need some yellow. (E., 2;00)
Plural noun pl NP for pl quantity Some people love Peppa Pig. (H., 3;00)
Singular NP sg count NP Some little boy kissed a chair. (H., 4;01)
Plural NP pl count NP I want some dinosaurs. (E., 2;01)
Of XP partitive preposition Mum keeps some of these balls. (E., 3;01)
Solitary some no spelled-out NP Po like some. (E., 2;00)
More might mean more I need some more. (E., 2;00)
Structure unclear pl NP for sg quantity Need some scissors. (E., 2;00)







Transcription some replaced I’ve got some ¡a triangle¿. (E., 2;00)
unclear incomplete phrase Let’s play some +... [+ IN] (E., 2;03)
transcription failure Mummy, let’s go some paint xxx. (E., 2;00)
unclear utterance I can do some [=? the] shopping. (E., 2;05)
sg, singular; pl, plural; NP, Noun Phrase (fully compatible with DP analysis).
7. Finally, the Of XP category covers prepositional phrases (e.g.,
I need some of these toys).
There are four Excluded categories. Utterances falling in one of
these categories were not analysed further.
1. In the Solitary some category, some is not followed by a noun.
2. TheMore category, includes utterances with some more. These
seem to mean more in the context of language acquisition as
children are often asking for some more of food for example.
Although it could be argued that more is used here as a
modification, an implicature is implausible in most such cases.
3. In the category Structure unclear, two different types of uses
are pooled.
(a) Plural nouns such as scissors and pants were excluded,
because it could not be established whether the noun refers
to a single quantity or to a mass.
(b) Some introducing conjunctive phrases were also excluded
due to the structural ambiguity. Indeed, it could not be
established whether some should be linked to the first
conjunct or the whole conjunctive phrase.
4. The category Transcription unclear also includes several
cases.
(a) When the sentence includes the word some, but is
continued with a replacement, the word some is
not used to quantify anymore (e.g., I want some,
a bread).
(b) Incomplete phrases were excluded when the referent for
some was missing (e.g., I want some +IN). When the
referent for some was uttered in the next line of the
transcription, the utterance was included since the referent
of the some phrase was readily available (e.g., “I want some
+IN. some grapes”).
(c) Partly unintelligible sentences (transcribed with xxx) were
also excluded.
(d) When the transcription left a doubt about some being
uttered, the utterance was excluded as well.
All occurrences of somewere also independently coded according
to additional, non-mutually exclusive, structural categories which
impact discourse accessibility and therefore the likelihood of an
upper-bounded reading of some. In doing so, we followed the
approach of Degen (2015), and collected data which could inform
how structural linguistic elements may influence implicature
probability. These categories also provide further dimensions
on which to compare child and adult production. For example,
it has been argued that the subject position tends to support
implicature interpretation (Degen, 2015). Breheny et al. (2006)
suggested that a scalar implicature is more likely when in focus
as focus highlights relevant content. This would then underline
the contrast between some and all. The same holds for phrases
that are topicalised, as the topic position is often associated with
focus which can support contrasting some with not all (e.g.,
Some of the grapes the girls ate). Third, we coded whether
the phrase was modified. On the one hand, modification can
increase the salience of a novel mention in a discourse (Degen,
2015). On the other hand, modification can also counteract
implicature plausibility when a set (e.g., of blocks) is then
already subsetted (e.g., blue) which reduces the salience of
some (e.g., I need some blue blocks). Forth, we coded whether
Of XP phrases were headed by a pronoun or demonstrative.
As Degen (2015) notes, pronoun and demonstrative phrases
with some are ungrammatical when used without the partitive
(Example 39 on p. 22: “And some *(of) them fizzled out,”
Degen, 2015). Nonetheless, in her study, sentences with and
without pronouns or demonstratives receive similarly high
ratings.
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TABLE 2 | Contextual categories indicating implicature plausibility.
Category Description Examples
Implicature impossible No available set I did some trumps. (E., 2;00)
Blowing some bubbles. (T., 3;01)
Implicature implausible Set possible but
not referred to
Squirrel wants some nuts.
(E., 2;00)
Implicature possible Maybe referring to
subset of set
Po’s got some biscuits
in his house. (E., 2;00)
Implicature plausible Referring to subset
of present set
I lost some pieces. (F., 3;00)
2.2.2. Contextual Categories
Utterances falling in one of the Included categories (see
Table 1) were then assigned to one of four, mutually
exclusive, contextual categories, which reflect their likeliness
to carry an implicature based on structure and the extracted
context (± 3 utterances): Implicature Impossible, Implicature
Implausible, Implicature Possible, and Implicature Plausible
(see Table 2).
1. For utterances categorised as Implicature Impossible, no
quantifiable set could be identified of which some could
have been a subset. With no clear set in the discourse, the
speaker cannot intend to refer to a subpart through a scalar
implicature (“I need some help”). For instance, this category
includes cases of spontaneously occurring natural phenomena
(like trumps or clouds).
2. In utterances categorised as Implicature Implausible, a
quantifiable set could be found, but the speaker was unlikely
to be referring to it in this context. For instance, it would be
possible in some contexts to use the sentence “We need to
buy some batteries” to refer to a subset of batteries. Yet, in
the corpus, the context suggested a more general meaning of
getting batteries.
3. In the occurrences categorised as Implicature Possible, a
quantifiable set could be identified and it was possible
that the speaker was using the quantifier some to refer to
a subset via an implicature, for instance in “I ate some
biscuits”. Yet, the available context does not provide sufficient
elements to disambiguate between the two readings roughly
paraphrased as “I ate biscuits” and “I ate some, but not all
biscuits”.
4. Finally, Implicature Plausible utterances involved a clearly
identifiable set, which was relevant to the conversational
exchange and to a subset the speaker seemed to be referring
to. Thus, the speaker seemed to have used some intending
the hearer to derive the scalar implicature and understand
not all. For instance, when in the context of playing with
jigsaw puzzles, a child utters “The puzzle is missing some
pieces.” Even in such cases, there can be no guarantee that the
speaker intended to convey an implicature, rather we establish
that the utterance is highly compatible with an implicature
interpretation.
As mentioned in the introduction, we had to assess the
likelihood of the speaker intending to convey an implicature
based on the hearer’s understanding of this intention—more
specifically, we have to rely on the coder’s pragmatic inferences.
Therefore, to avoid false positives and inflating the proportion of
intended implicatures, the less implicature-compatible category
was chosen when in doubt about the most appropriate contextual
category for an utterance.
To correctly categorise all phrases, certain tests were applied.
As seen above, to establish implicature plausibility, Degen (2015)
used similarity ratings with paraphrases where somewas replaced
by some but not all (e.g., “I ate some biscuits” and “I ate some, but
not all, biscuits”).We used the paraphrase test as a guideline: high
similarity would correspond to a categorisation as Implicature
Possible or even Implicature Plausible when the context strongly
supported an implicature reading.
However, note that all is not necessarily the upper bound in
all discourses as it can also be interpreted differently in certain
pragmatic contexts. For example, when all is used to exaggerate,
it can actually mean some or most (e.g., “She ate all the biscuits!”
when meaning that this person did not leave many biscuits for
the rest of the group. See also section 4).
Another paraphrase test we used as a guideline was the
omission of the quantifier. When some can be left out
[as in “I need (some) help” or “We need to buy (some)
batteries”], it seems to be used as an indefinite marker and the
occurrence would be categorised as Implicature Impossible or
Implicature Implausible. To decide between these two categories,
the content was taken into account. When no set could be
defined (as in “help”), then the Implicature Impossible category
was chosen. When a set could be identified, but was either
non-quantificational or not the topic of discussion (e.g., an
existing set of batteries in the store, but not relevant to the
dialog) the utterance would fall into the Implicature Implausible
category.
Context remained crucial to judgments about categorisation.
Take a child saying “I want to eat some grapes,” for instance.
It is possible that there is a set of grapes in the kitchen. In
most cases, it would be unlikely that the child is referring to
that set. The implicature would thus be deemed Implausible.
On the other hand, if the mother just uttered “See, there
are some grapes on the table, the rest is in the kitchen,”
now the context establishes clear, relevant subsets and the
implicature of the mother’s utterance seems Plausible. The
same holds if the child said “I want to eat some grapes. The
others are for you,” thereby actively differentiating between
subsets.
A second coder independently coded 1,730 out of the 14,306
utterances of the overall corpus data; roughly 20% of Included
and 9.5% of Excluded utterances split proportionally across
children and adults, which sums up to roughly 12% of the
whole corpus. Interrater reliability for all utterances was at 85%
indicating very high agreement overall (contextual categories:
81% and Cohens Kappa of 0.7; structural categories: 89% and
Cohens Kappa of 0.87. Cohens Kappa was calculated using
confusion matrices with the package caret in R; Kuhn, 2013, for
the use of Cohen’s Kappa to assess interrater reliability, see Landis
and Koch, 1977; Viera and Garrett, 2005; Cameron-Faulkner
et al., 2007; Spooren and Degand, 2010).
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Count as mass noun 480 8.44
Adjective 23 0.40
Plural noun 110 1.93
Singular NP 63 1.11
Plural NP 1,605 28.22
Of X 277 4.87








Structure unclear 156 2.74
Transcription unclear 214 3.76
Percentages are in proportion to all 5,687 utterances. N of Included utterances: 4,172; N
of Excluded utterances: 1,515.
TABLE 4 | Results for the contextual categories of the mothers’ data.
Category N %
Implicature impossible 710 17.02
Implicature implausible 2,774 66.49
Implicature possible 420 10.07
Implicature plausible 268 6.42
Percentages are in proportion to all 4,172 Included utterances.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Mothers’ Usage
Categorisation of the 5,687 utterances coded for the mothers
can be seen in the Tables 3 and 4. Note that the number of
appearances deviates from the extracted utterances as some could
appear more than once in a sentence.
Regarding the structural categories, the categories Mass and
Plural NP dominated. Adjectival phrases were rare. Exclusionwas
highest for theMore category.
The some phrase appeared rarely in subject position (N =
63, 1.15%), and was almost never topicalised (N = 3, 0.07%),
and therefore mostly realised in object position. A small part of
utterances was modified pre- or post-phrasal (N = 450, 10.79%).
Around a quarter of all Of XP utterances were headed by a
pronoun or a demonstrative (N = 75, 27.08%) .
As in Degen (2015), structural properties seemed to relate
to implicature plausibility as can be seen in Figure 1: While
some in subject position supported an implicature reading
(Implicature Plausible ratings), modifications were mostly found
in the Implicature Implausible category.
In the contextual categories, Implicature Plausible utterances
represented a small proportion of the Included set (6.42%), while
most utterances were categorised as Implicature Implausible
(66.49%).
Looking at the relation between structural and contextual
categories we find more Implicature Plausible ratings in certain
TABLE 5 | Contextual categorisation of the individual Included structural
categories of the mothers’ data.
Category Total N Impossible Implausible Possible Plausible
N % N % N % N %
Mass 1,614 362 22.43 1,121 69.46 114 7.06 17 1.05
Count as mass noun 480 143 29.79 333 69.38 0 0 4 0.83
Adjective 23 0 0 23 100 0 0 0 0
Plural Noun 110 0 0 96 87.27 6 5.46 8 7.28
Singular NP 63 0 0 63 100 0 0 0 0
Plural NP 1605 205 12.77 1,138 70.9 218 13.58 44 2.74
Of XP 277 0 0 0 0 82 9.62 195 70.4









Count as mass noun 279 5.25
Some adjective 45 0.85
Plural noun 75 1.41
Singular NP 140 2.64
Plural NP 1,078 20.3






d Solitary some 754 14.20
More 754 14.20
Structure unclear 100 1.88
Transcription unclear 819 15.42
Percentages are in proportion to all 5,310 utterances. N of Included utterances: 2,883; N
of Excluded utterances: 2,427.
structural categories and close to none in others (see Table 5).
For example, there were no Implicature Plausible cases amongst
Singular NP. Cases of Plural NP, however, could belong to any
of the four contextual categories. Furthermore, Of XP utterances
were prone to be categorised as Implicature Plausible (N = 195,
70.4%). Thus, the partitive structure seems to support implicature
interpretation. On the other hand, structures suggesting a
singular quantity are difficult to combine with a partitive reading
and are unlikely to give rise to an implicature reading. A structure
such as the Plural NP category is more flexible; it allows for
more variation in implicature readings, and its interpretation is
therefore highly dependent on context.
3.2. Children’s Usage
Table 6 provides the structural categorisation and Table 7 the
contextual categorisation for all 5,310 some utterances of the
children. Again, the number of appearances deviates from the
extracted utterances as some could appear more than once in a
sentence.
Note that children, as their mothers, used some in several
different structural forms and that, again as their mothers, there
is a predominance of Mass and Plural NP usage. Adjectival
phrases were rare for children, too. Exclusion was highest for the
Transcription unclear category. Overall, more utterances had to
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TABLE 7 | Results for the contextual categories of the children’s data, indicating
plausibility of implicatures for included utterances.
Category N %
Implicature impossible 282 9.78
Implicature implausible 2,040 70.76
Implicature possible 322 11.17
Implicature plausible 239 8.29
Percentages are in proportion to all 2,883 included utterances.
be excluded than in the mothers’ data suggesting that the data of
the children were noisier, as would be expected considering their
age.
As for their mothers, the some phrase appeared rarely in
subject position (N = 86, 2.98%), and was never topicalised,
and therefore mostly realised in object position. A small part of
utterances was modified pre- or post-phrasal (N = 213, 7.39%).
More than half of all Of XP utterances were headed by a pronoun
or a demonstrative (N = 113, 60.75%) .
As in Degen (2015) and our adult data, structural properties
seemed to relate to implicature plausibility as can be seen
in Figure 1: While some in subject position supported an
implicature reading (Implicature Plausible ratings), modifications
were mostly found in the Implicature Implausible category.
Interestingly, in the children’s contextual categorisation,
implicature production can clearly be observed. A total of 19.46%
of the Included cases were categorised as Implicature Possible
or Implicature Plausible, despite the fact that the Implicature
Implausible was still the most largely represented.
Here again, implicature plausibility diverged depending on
the structural category as can be seen in Table 8. For example,
Singular NP provided no Implicature Plausible cases, indicating
that its structure is a cue against implicature plausibility as
suggested by Degen (2015, p. 5). The Plural NP category however,
provided utterances belonging to all four contextual categories.
Thus, such a structure allows for more variation in implicature
readings; whether it gives rise to an implicature interpretation
or not is therefore highly dependent on context. As observed in
the mothers’ production, the Of XP category was prone to carry
implicatures (N = 158, 84.95%). Therefore, the partitive structure
supported implicature readings also in the children’s data.
We also looked at children’s individual production of some
over time within the corpus to establish when different types of
uses, as well as implicature production, first appear (see Table 9).
The resulting developmental picture shows that children begin
using some in its many forms during their third year of life.
Importantly, this includes implicature production. Indeed, as can
be seen inTable 9, the first Implicature Plausible instances of some
produced by the three 2-year-olds appear 3 to 9months after their
first use of some in the corpus.
Altogether, the findings indicate children’s competence
regarding different types of some including pragmatic
production. To see whether their behaviour mirrors the
input provided by their mothers, we next turn to the comparison
of these results with child-directed speech.
TABLE 8 | Contextual categorisation of the individual Included structural
categories of the children’s data.
Category Total N Impossible Implausible Possible Plausible
N % N % N % N %
Mass 1,080 135 12.5 829 76.76 103 9.54 13 1.2
Count as mass noun 279 54 19.36 225 80.65 0 0 0 0
Adjective 45 0 0 45 100 0 0 0 0
Plural Noun 75 0 0 30 40 17 22.67 28 37.34
Singular NP 140 0 0 140 100 0 0 0 0
Plural NP 1,078 93 8.63 769 71.34 176 16.33 40 3.71
Of XP 186 0 0 0 0 28 15.05 158 84.95
TABLE 9 | Overall data of the individual children.
Child Recording Total Incl Excl 1st some 1st Category 1st implicature
Eleanor 2;00 - 3;01 937 497 440 2;00;03 Mass 2;04;02
Fraser 2:00 - 3;01 627 359 268 2;00;28 Mass 2;03;06
Thomas 2;00 - 4;11 1770 906 864 2;00;13 Mass 2;09;11
Gina 3;00 - 4;07 971 504 467 3;00;01 Plural NP 3;00;04
Helen 3;00 - 5;01 1005 617 388 3;00;02 Plural NP 3;00;10
Incl, N of utterances in included categories; Excl, N of utterances in excluded categories.
3.3. Comparison of the Children and Their
Mothers
Children’s production and mothers’ child-directed speech did
not differ significantly from each other in either structural or
contextual categories (Mann Whitney U, ps > 0.1, Kilgarriff,
2001), indicating similar usage patterns across groups (see
Figures 2 and 3). Thus, implicature production was similarly low.
Even when pooling Implicature Possible and Implicature Plausible
utterances, only 16.49% of adults’ and 19.46% children’s uses of
some in the Included categories potentially carry an implicature
(cf. Degen, 2015, for similarly low rates).
Interestingly, mothers’ usage of some changed as a function
of the child’s age. To analyse how the mothers’ implicature
production changes, we further coded roughly 300 utterances of
the mother after each birthday of her child. Tomodel the data, we
fitted a generalized linearmixedmodel using lme4s lmer function
(Bates et al., 2015) with Gaussian error structure and identity link
function in R (R Core Team, 2016). Contextual Category and the
child’s age, and their interaction were included as fixed effects
of interest. We also included Child as a random factor to allow
for random slopes across participants. The number of utterances
in each category at each age was transformed to percentages
to standardize the dependent measure across mothers and time
points. A reduced model was fit that did not include Contextual
Category. A comparison between the reduced model and the full
model then allows for conclusions about differential effects in the
different contextual categories across the ages. Results can be seen
in Table 10 and Figure 4.
Comparing the full with the reduced model revealed that
Contextual Category significantly improved the model fit (χ2
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FIGURE 1 | Structural influences on the implicature plausibility of some in (A) subject position (Adult N = 63, Child N = 86), and (B) some being modified (Adult N =
450, Child N = 214) in caregivers’ (yellow) and children’s (blue) production.
FIGURE 2 | Structural categories in caregivers’ (yellow) and children’s (blue) production. Percentages are in proportion to all utterances per group.
= 150.47, df = 6, p < 0.001). Using drop1, the model revealed
a significant interaction of Contextual Category*Age (χ2 =
39.22, df = 3, p < 0.001), suggesting differences between
contextual categories at different ages. To analyse these effects
further, we split the data according to the different contextual
categories. In the model examining the data from the contextual
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FIGURE 3 | Contextual categories in caregivers’ (yellow) and children’s (blue)
production. Percentages are in proportion to Included utterances per group.
category Impossible alone (Impossible split model), there was
no significant effect of age. For the Implausible split model, the
effect of age was significant (χ2 = 6.09, df = 1, p = 0.014). For
the Possible split model, the effect of age only tended toward
significance (χ2 = 3.4, df = 1, p = 0.065). For the Plausible split
model, the effect of age was significant (χ2 = 29.67, df = 1, p
< 0.001). Thus, with each birthday of the child, the mother’s
number of Implicature Plausible instances increased, and the
number of Implicature Implausible ones decreased. However,
neither Implicature Impossible nor Implicature Possible utterances
changed significantly in number across the ages.
3.4. Further Observations
Before we turn to the possible implications of these results, we
would like to present a few additional qualitative observations.
These are potentially very interesting and would deserve a
systematic investigation that goes beyond the scope of the current
study. First, we highlight some cases where children contrast
directly the quantifier some with other relevant quantifiers.
Second, we discuss how modification and some in subject
position might interact with each other. Finally, we present a few
cases where children’s utterances were erroneous.
In order to assess how competent young children are with
scalar implicatures linked to some it is worth looking at whether
they spontaneously contrast some with other quantifiers on the
same semantic “scale.” We found some cases in the corpus where
children contrast some directly either with all or with other
quantifiers. Below are four such examples from Thomas and
Fraser between 2;02 and 3;08. Further examples can be found in
the Supplementary Material.
(1) Contrasting some with all (Fraser, 3;00)
*FAT: Put all these pieces away.
CHI: You don’t put all of them away.
FAT: Why?
CHI: Just do [/] just do (.) some at the time.
CHI: Not all of them.
FAT: Not all of them?
CHI: No.
(2) Contrasting some with all (Mum of Fraser, 2;02)
*MOT: you dropped some pennies.
CHI: allmy pennies.
(3) Contrasting some with lots (Thomas, 3;08)
*CHI: just put some things back in the box.
INV: do you want to put them back in the box?
CHI: yes.
CHI: some of them but not lots of them.
INV: okay.
INV: are you keeping [//] are you keeping everything
tidy?
INV: yeah?
(4) Contrasting some with some (Fraser, 3;00)
*FAT: Yeah.
CHI: But some girls don’t.
FAT: No.
CHI: But some girls do.
FAT: *chuckles* Some boys don’t like milk either.
CHI: But, but...
FAT: Makes them poorly.
Moreover, we observe a structural hierarchy of implicature
plausibility. Indeed, in both adults and children some in subject
position supported implicature readings, while modifications
hindered implicature readings. While these general lines are
very clear, the combination of different factors results in a more
complex picture. The combination of modification and the some
phrase in subject position reduces the implicature likelihood
(e.g., “Some blue blocks are missing” in the context of many
blocks. See also Example 6). In contrast, the combination of
modification and the some of partitive phrase in subject position
makes implicature readings more likely again (e.g., “Some of
the blue blocks are missing” in the context of many blocks. See
also Example 7). Some of highlights the partitive interpretation
(84.95% in children), and thus, this structure might serve as a cue
to implicature interpretation that outweighs modification; even
though the phrase some of is not sufficient for an implicature
interpretation in and of itself (See Example 8, and see also Degen
and Tanenhaus, 2011). Of course, these observations are based on
few utterances and more detailed exploration is needed.
(5) Modification (Helen, 4;00)
*MOT: that’s to put that plant in, isn’t it?
CHI: oh yeah.
CHI: but the plant comes out.
CHI: I’ve got some even better funny ones.
(6) Modification in subject position hindering implicature
(Helen, 4;08)
*CHI: and some new people are coming.
MOT: are they?
CHI: yeah some new school children that go to
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TABLE 10 | Generalized Linear Mixed Model testing the relative change in the frequency of utterances of the mothers across the childrens ages in the contextual
categories Impossible, Implausible, Possible, and Plausible. res = lmer(Utterances ∼ Category*Age + (1 + Age | Child); data = d2; REML = F; control = contr).
Estimates SE Lower CL Upper CL χ2 p
Full model(1) (Intercept) 0.09 0.05 –0.01 0.18 (3) (3)
Cat: Implausible 0.83 0.07 0.69 0.96 (3) (3)
Cat: Possible –0.03 0.07 –0.16 0.12 (3) (3)
Cat: Plausible –0.15 0.07 –0.28 –0.01 (3) (3)
Age 0.03 0.01 –0.00 0.06 (3) (3)
Cat: Implausible:Age –0.12 0.02 –0.16 –0.08 (3) (3)
Cat: Possible:Age –0.01 0.02 –0.05 0.03 (3) (3)
Cat: Plausible:Age 0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.07 (3) (3)
Impossible(2) (Intercept) 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.25 (3) (3)
Age –0.00 0.02 –0.04 0.03 0.02 0.89
Implausible(2) (Intercept) 0.87 0.07 0.73 1.00 (3) (3)
Age –0.08 0.02 –0.12 –0.03 6.09 0.01
Possible(2) (Intercept) 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.13 (3) (3)
Age 0.02 0.01 –0.00 0.04 3.40 0.07
Plausible(2) (Intercept) –0.06 0.02 –0.09 –0.03 (3) (3)
Age 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.06 29.67 <0.001
(1) df = 3.
(2) df = 1.
(3) Not shown because of having a very limited interpretation as this value is only in relation to the reference level.
Wwww_Mwww [% school].
MOT: right.
(7) Some of in subject position overriding modification
(Mother of Thomas, 2;03)
*MOT: some of the little bubble bath tab eh [//] bubble
tabs that we’ve bought haven’t been very good, but this
one is special. Teletubby double bubble it’s called.
(8) Uncertain some of case (Gina, 4;01)
*CHI: I wanna touch some of this.
CHI: I wanna touch someone with this.
CHI: I wanna touch some of this.
MOT: no it’s bacon.
A final observation concerns the type of errors children
produced. For all children, the category Singular NP seemed
to be used erroneously: they used some as a determiner with
count nouns (e.g., some garden). This resembles a mass noun
construction, but would usually be expressed with a simple
determiner such as a, as we can see in Example 9. This might
indicate an overgeneralisation of the frequent count as mass noun
pattern.
(9) Erroneous Singular NP utterance (Eleanor, 2;04)
*CHI: I’ve got some garden.
*MOT: you’ve got a garden?
CHI: yeah.
MOT: I like gardens.
Another type of mistake was the production of multiple
quantifiers in a row, such as in Example 10.
FIGURE 4 | Relative change in the frequency of utterances of the mothers
across the childrens age span in the contextual categories Impossible,
Implausible, Possible, and Plausible. The lines reflect the fitted model of the
GLMM including Contextual Category and Age, as well as their interaction. res
= lmer(Utterances ∼ Category*Age + (1 + Age | Child); data = d2; REML = F;
control = contr).
(10) Several quantifiers (Thomas, 3;01)
*CHI: I want that’s lots some few things here.
MOT: oh alright.
MOT: you want to look at those books up there?
These cases are mainly present around age 3, when children
seem to have acquired the basics of the adult system (Lieven
and Behrens, 2012). This pattern of error is particularly
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interesting and could enlighten our understanding of the
development of language structure. In particular, a closer look
to these cases could have an impact on syntax-based approaches
to scalars (e.g., Chierchia, 2004, 2006), which we discuss
briefly below.
4. DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated young children’s implicature
production by looking at the production of some in five
young children and their mothers. Overall, 14,306 utterances
containing somewere extracted from dense corpora of five British
English children aged 2;00 to 5;01 (N = 5,276) and alongside
that, an equivalent portion for their parents was analysed (N
= 9,030). All instances of some were categorised according
to mutually exclusive structural and contextual categories.
Structural categories were based on syntactic form while
contextual categories considered the contextual environment of
the utterance and allowed for judgments on the probability of a
scalar implicature being intended.
Analysis of the parents’ production revealed that few
uses of some could be meant to carry an implicature. Our
highest implicature plausibility category (Implicature Plausible)
represents 6.42% of the adult data (8.29% of the children data).
A generous approximation of potential intended implicatures
pooling together the Implicature Possible and the Implicature
Plausible categories gathers 16.5% of the adult some cases (19.5%
of the children’s). Importantly, the adult results also imply that
children are rarely confronted with upper-bound some.
Interestingly, the parents’ implicature production increased
as a function of the children’s age. We note an increase of the
Implicature Plausible cases and a decrease of the Implicature
Implausible instances over the years. This might be due in part to
the large number of Implicature Implausible utterances related to
food (i.e., “Want some banana”), while Implicature Plausible cases
highlight a contrast. The change, then, might be brought about by
conversations evolving from a focus on more basic desires, such
as nutrition, to more complex arguments about variations in the
world (“Some girls have brown hair”). While this aspect of our
findings would need to be investigated further in future research,
the changes in parents’ production suggest an evolving learning
environment for the child.
The low frequency of implicatures in child-directed speech
corroborates the findings of Degen (2015) and Sun (2017) in
other adult corpora. Unfortunately, because of differences in
methodology our data are not directly comparable to theirs.
Degen and Sun both relied on on-line participants ratings
on a seven point Likert scale to assess the likelihood of
an implicature being intended, while we assessed implicature
plausibility according to coding on a four categories scheme
performed by one or two coders. The proportion of combined
Implicature Possible and Implicature Plausible cases we find
(16.5%, for two out of four categories) is lower than that of
the ratings higher than midpoint in either studies (44.7% for
Degen and 64% for Sun). Note that Sun’s is already higher
than Degen’s and that the short study by Huang and Snedeker
(2009b) reports that a relatively high 42% some occurrences
“unambiguously referred to a subset” (Huang and Snedeker,
2009b, p. 410). It is unclear that looking at midpoint ratings
is the best way to compare these different data sets. For
instance, Degen finds that only 14.7% (Degen, 2015, p. 12)
of her data corresponds to the highest ratings while, under
what she considers to be the best analysis of the components,
28% are generated by an upper-bound interpretation (Degen,
2015, p. 16). Yet, even from this angle, our data seem
to foster less upper-bound some instances than these other
studies.
The discrepancy in the various findings might stem from
two sources: differences in the nature of the corpora, on the
one hand, and differences in the way implicature plausibility
was established on the other. First, corpora varied greatly in
kind and in size: we coded 4,172 included some instances
taken from child-directed speech in every day activities, while
Huang and Snedeker (2009b) looked at 50 occurrences of some
from the British National Corpus, Degen (2015) analysed 1,748
from telephone dialogues and 200 cases taken from tweets
were rated in Sun (2017). This diversity might influence some
distributions. For instance, Sun (2017, p. 80) notes that a higher
percentage of partitive some in her corpus might, in part,
explain why she finds higher implicature plausibility ratings
than Degen (2015). It is also possible that parents addressing a
young child intend less upper-bound readings of some. Such an
interpretation fits well with our finding that parent Implicature
Plausible instances increase as their children grow. We found
many utterances of the “want some grapes” type in child-parent
interactions; probably substantially more than we would in adult
conversation. Yet, without further evidence, this conclusion
is premature since several other parameters might explain a
somewhat lower frequency of upper-bound some cases in our
data.
Second, diverging findings might come down to differences
in data collection (rating vs. coding), implicature assessment
tests (existence of a subset vs. not all paraphrases) or exclusion
criteria for irrelevant cases. For example, Sun (2017) filtered out
occurrences falling under the scope of negation, in questions
or conditional antecedents, and Degen (2015) took out singular
some cases, while we did neither. The crucial parameter in
explaining the difference between our results and those of
Degen and Sun is probably how implicature plausibility was
coded for. Indeed, untrained Mechanical-Turkers are likely to
be more lenient in their assessment than linguistically trained
coders instructed to be conservative when granting implicature
plausibility (to prevent overestimating implicature production
in toddlers). Importantly, discussion about differences in
findings and methods of assessments should not distract us
from the striking convergence of all available adult corpus
studies on a low proportion of upper-bound interpretation for
some.
The relatively low frequency of adult implicature production
found in all four corpora clearly speaks against what Degen
(2015) coined the Frequency Assumption. No matter how one
looks at the data it is impossible to claim that the predominant
reading of some is prone to implicature. This important, and now
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robust, finding is difficult to reconcile with theories assuming
that some commonly induces implicatures, such as syntactic
accounts (e.g., Chierchia et al., 2012) or Horn’s (1984, 1989)
Generalised Conversational Implicature thesis and Levinson’s
default theory (Levinson, 2000), which maintains that some
will give rise to a scalar implicature by default, unless the
context blocks the inference. Additionally, as Degen (2015)
argues, the low frequency of some-related implicatures in corpus
research also has consequences for the so-called Literal-First-
Hypothesis (Huang and Snedeker, 2009a). According to this
thesis, the interpretation of upper-bound some follows a two-
stage processing model where it always appears with a delay, after
the lower-bound reading has been computed. This hypothesis
is not directly contradicted by the low frequency of upper-
bound readings in corpora, but it makes it more difficult to
test. Indeed, while several researchers have shown that deriving
a scalar implicature linked to some comes at a cognitive cost
and is processed slower (Breheny et al., 2006; De Neys and
Schaeken, 2007; Huang and Snedeker, 2009a, 2011; Degen and
Tanenhaus, 2011; Bergen and Grodner, 2012; Bott et al., 2012),
this could be due to the low frequency of the reading rather than
to a two-stage processing. After all, as Degen (2015) points out,
frequency is a well-established factor in psycholinguistics and
there is no reason to assume it would not influence pragmatic
aspects, too.
Interestingly, structural elements influence implicature
plausibility both in the production by parents and children.
Here, too, our data corroborates the work of Degen (2015). For
instance, some in the subject position increases the likelihood
of an implicature (as in Degen, 2015, p. 28). In contrast,
modification reduces implicature likelihood; although, this
finding is not as pronounced in Degen’s analysis (Degen, 2015,
p. 29). Additionally, some structural categories seemed related
to implicature plausibility. Singular Some cases, for instance,
did not include any Implicature Plausible cases and indeed
they were part of the excluded categories in Degen (2015). On
the other hand, the majority of Some Of cases did support
an implicature reading; as was found both by Degen (2015,
p. 23) and Sun (2017, p. 80). While partitive some does not
always promote an implicature, it often does and more often
so than non-partitive some (see also Degen and Tanenhaus,
2011).
It is worth noting that we found a high proportion of
some uses in constructions typical of English (as opposed to
many other Indo-European languages) and where some cannot
necessarily be linked to implicature production. Specifically,
the determiner some is frequent in English (e.g., “I need some
batteries”). While it might be meant to carry an implicature
when a set of batteries is present, it can also be a simple
determiner phrase when no set is referenced (28.22% of all
utterances in adults and 20.41% of all utterances in children, see
also Bagassi et al., 2009; Degen, 2015, for a thorough discussion).
This reading is widespread in English, but would be conveyed
without recourse to the quantifier some in other languages (see
Supplementary Material for examples and their translations).
Such instances were categorised as Implicature Implausible and
might induce a lower rate of implicature plausibility than in other
languages. In her work, Degen (2015) concludes that implicatures
are highly dependent on syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
influences from the context and appear to be probabilistic in
nature—i.e., rather than being an all-or-nothing phenomenon
it makes sense to ask to what degree they arise (see also Degen
and Tanenhaus, 2015). Our results support her argument: in
the present study, implicature-compatible utterances in both
child-directed speech and children’s production are low in
frequency, but seem dependent on syntactic and contextual
information.
The most surprising aspect of the data, of course, is that
children produce Implicature Plausible instances of some very
early on and at rates matching those of their parents. The
children’s production of some mirrors that of their parents’
in all aspects. Although, this has also been found for other
structural phenomena in language (e.g., Kidd et al., 2007),
the degree of resemblance between adult and child production
both in the structural and in the contextual categories is
remarkable (see Figures 2 and 3). The overall pattern of the
findings suggests children master the use of some early on
with a distribution of some mimicking child-directed speech.
This is what one would expect considering work on frequency
matching between parents’ and children’s speech (Ambridge
et al., 2015). It seems natural that the children use some
highly frequently in non-implicature, more low scope formulaic
utterances such as “I want some banana,” since parents use
these constructions very frequently. The real surprise, then, is
that children produce scalar implicatures, which are regarded
as a complex pragmatic inference, so early. Although parents’
production suggests children are rarely confronted with instances
of some meant to carry implicatures, utterances favouring a
lower-bound interpretation nonetheless appear in their third
year of life (or were present as soon as the recording
started), shortly after their first production of some (Eleanor
2;04;02, Fraser 2;03;06, Thomas 2;09;11, Gina 3;00;04, Helen
3;00;10; see Table 2). As for their parents, some is produced
in many different syntactic structures; implicatures appear to
be rare and dependent on linguistic structure and context.
Nevertheless, almost as soon as they acquire some, we see
the children producing it competently, including upper-bound
uses.
How can we account for such an early production of
implicatures? There is ample evidence that children calculate
intentions in communicative contexts even preverbally (e.g.,
Tomasello, 2008). Indeed, much work, in language acquisition
also suggests that they could not learn to speak without
impressive pragmatic abilities (e.g., Bloom, 2000; Tomasello,
2003; Clark, 2016). Once they have figured out the semantics
of some, children might therefore be able to work out how to
produce the implicature. An additional element is necessary, of
course, the understanding that some might be on a semantic
scale with other quantifiers (all, many, most), or at least that
its meaning can contrast with theirs. Examples (1)-(3) above
indicate they do so early on. Yet, such an interpretation of early
scalar implicature production and, more generally, our findings
contrast with work showing that some-related implicatures
are understood relatively late in childhood, and thus, call
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for an explanation. On the one hand, our production results
corroborate the study by Katsos and Smith (2010) suggesting
that implicature production arises early. On the other hand,
the earliest children have been found to understand some-
related scalar implicatures is 4 (Pouscoulous et al., 2007; Katsos
and Bishop, 2011), while our findings suggest that they can
produce some with an upper-bound reading from the age of
two. The gap between these two sets of evidence must be
bridged.
An account along lexicalist lines (e.g., Barner et al., 2011)
might find it difficult to contend with such early implicature
production. If toddlers have not associated some with its lexical
scale (many, most, all), this should affect their ability to produce,
as well as comprehend, implicatures. Importantly, examples
where children’s use of some is directly contrasted with another
member of the semantic scale (all or other, see Examples 1
- 4 and Supplementary Material), reinforce a picture where
children master the contrast set of some from a very early age—
as young as 2;03 for some of them. These cases indicate that the
Implicature Plausible instances found in child production are not
merely an artifact of our way of categorising some-utterances, but
truly reflect the ability of very young children to intend scalar
implicatures linked to some. They also speak further against a
lexicalist account of scalar implicature acquisition. Therefore,
an approach on the development of scalars integrating several
contextual factors might be more appropriate to reconcile the
experimental comprehension findings with our production data.
Several elements may explain children’s behaviour in
comprehension experiments such as their pragmatic tolerance
(Katsos and Bishop, 2011), the relevance of the implicature
in context (Papafragou and Musolino, 2003; Guasti et al.,
2005; Skordos and Papafragou, 2016), and children’s limited
processing resources when faced with an infrequent, relatively
effortful inference (Reinhart, 2004; Pouscoulous et al., 2007).
Indeed, pragmatic tolerance constrains experimental measures
of implicature comprehension, since children might be inclined
to judge a sentence as correct despite pragmatic infelicity.
But, of course, pragmatic tolerance would have no impact on
production. Similarly, while implicature comprehension might
be affected by how relevant the scalar implicature is in context,
relevance does not influence production: if a speaker intends
to produce an implicature, then it is a priori relevant to them.
These factors combined with children’s limited exposure to
some-related implicatures may be sufficient to account for
the discrepancy between production and comprehension. In
this view, children are capable of producing and inferring
some-related implicatures from their third year of life and any
difficulty in understanding them in experimental settings is to
be attributed to factors outside their semantic and pragmatic
competence.
This type of account also resonates with experimental
findings suggesting a much earlier comprehension of linguistic
pragmatic phenomena than previously thought. Indeed, while
preschoolers find most pragmatic inferences challenging on
traditional metalinguistic tasks such as explaining or judging
the truth value of an utterance, a few recent studies indicate
that they fare much better with paradigms using act-out or
picture selection tasks: 3-year-olds understand other pragmatic
phenomena (e.g., Berger and Höhle 2012 on presupposition;
Falkum et al. (2017) onmetonymy; Pearson (1990) onmetaphor),
but also other implicatures (Schulze et al., 2013, on relevance
implicatures) and even other types of scalar implicatures (Stiller
et al., 2014, on ad hoc scalar implicatures).
In the past decade a lot of work has been devoted to children’s
comprehension of some. In fact, our knowledge of implicature
acquisition is largely based on their understanding of this one
expression. A systematic corpus analysis of how toddlers hear
and produce it should therefore be essential to any informed
argument in the debate. The findings indicate that children
begin producing and interpreting implicatures in a pragmatic
way during their third year of life, very soon after they first
produce some. Thus, almost as soon as they acquire some,
children produce it competently and mirror adult behaviour.
Their production of some implicatures is low but matches their
parent’s input in frequency. In both children and adults some
appears to be multifaceted and implicatures are infrequent, and
both structurally contextually constrained. Our findings add to a
growing body of evidence showing that the upper-bound reading
of some is much less frequent in adult speech than some scholars
would have had us believe. Our study is also the first to go
against the popular belief in some psychology and linguistics
circles that children do not produce implicatures, much less
so lexicalized scalar implicatures, at an early age. Yet, it does
by no means answer all the questions. The method we used
has its flaws in that it relies on coder judgment; it has its
strengths, too, in the nature and size of the corpus we used.
The similarity between other adult findings and ours, and the
striking resemblance between our adult and children results give
us reasonable confidence in the soundness of our paradigm. In
any case, this work should be expanded by experimental research
looking at children’s production of some and other implicatures.
An important question which still requires a more fine-tuned
answer – both empirically and theoretically – is how children
can appear to fare so poorly with implicatures in experimental
paradigms if the basic mechanisms are in place so early.
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